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I. PEARSON V. CALLAHAN
The Supreme Court's decision in Pearson v. Callahan'
marked a significant change in the structure of the analysis to be per-
formed in the adjudication of the qualified immunity defense in
§ 1983 litigation. Prior to Pearson, the Court required a mandatory
two-step approach for the qualified immunity analysis.2 Whenever
qualified immunity was raised in response to an alleged constitutional
violation, the lower courts were instructed that the disposition of the
qualified immunity issue required the court to first address the merits
question.3  Under Saucier v. Katz,4 the courts were required first to
decide whether the complaint stated a violation of a constitutional
right under current law before addressing the question of whether the
law was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.5
This mandatory two-step approach was frequently criticized by sev-
eral Supreme Court Justices6 and a number of lower court judges.7
. Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This Article is based on a presentation
originally delivered by Professor Blum at the Practising Law Institute's Twenty-Sixth An-
nual Conference on Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation in New York, New York.
129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
2 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
3 Id. at 207 ("Our instruction to the district courts and courts of appeals to concentrate at
the outset on the definition of the constitutional right and to determine whether, on the facts
alleged, a constitutional violation could be found is important."); see also Bingue v. Prun-
chak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We now turn to the merits of the appeal, wheth-
er Prunchak is entitled to qualified immunity on Bingue's federal claims. In making this de-
termination, we apply the Supreme Court's two-part sequential test.").
4 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
5 Id. at 201.
6 See, e.g., id at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The two-part test today's decision im-
poses holds large potential to confuse."); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425
433
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Some of this criticism was merited, and the imposition of the non-
(2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("This Court
need not and should not decide this difficult First Amendment issue on the merits. Rather, I
believe that it should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student's claim for mone-
tary damages and say no more."); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 583 n.10 (2007) (Gins-
burg, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As I have else-
where indicated, in appropriate cases, I would allow courts to move directly to the second
inquiry."); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[L]ower
courts should be free to decide the two questions in whatever order makes sense in the con-
text of a particular case."); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)
(Breyer, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing concern "that the
current rule rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions
when there is available an easier basis for the decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will
satisfactorily resolve the case before the court"); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019
(2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(noting problem posed by an "unwise judge-made rule under which courts must decide
whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation before addressing the question
whether the defendant state actor is entitled to qualified immunity"); id. at 1023 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (urging that "this general rule [of refusing to entertain
a party's appeal on an issue as to which she prevailed] should not apply where a favorable
judgment on qualified-immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to appeal
the unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional determination").
See, e.g., Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[T]he underlying prin-
ciple of law elaboration is not meaningfully advanced in situations, such as this, when the
definition of constitutional rights depends on a federal court's uncertain assumptions about
state law."); Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
Saucier rule may lead to the publication of a lot of bad constitutional law that is, effectively,
cert-proof."); Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2431
(2009) (noting that "a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds puts the court in the
difficult position of deciding 'far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-existent factual
record' " (quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004)));
Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 60 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[O]ur resolu-
tion of the constitutional issue would be dependent on ruling on an unclear question of Puer-
to Rico law. This would hardly create clearly established law for future cases."); McClish v.
Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1253 n.l (11th Cir. 2007) (Anderson, J., concurring specially) (criti-
cizing the mandatory constitutional-question-first approach and noting that "twenty-eight
states and Puerto Rico have recently urged the Supreme Court in an amicus brief to recon-
sider its mandatory Saucier approach to qualified immunity" (citing Brief for the States of
Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
(No. 05-1631))); Robinette v. Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 592 n.8 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he 'law's
elaboration from case to case,' would be ill served by a ruling here, where the parties have
provided very few facts to define and limit any holding on the reasonableness of the execu-
tion of the arrest warrant." (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201)) (citation omitted); Estate of
Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We do not think the law elaboration
purpose will be well served here, where the Fourth Amendment inquiry involves a reasona-
bleness question which is highly idiosyncratic and heavily dependent on the facts."); Lyons
v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 583 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("Much as the
Saucier two-step inquiry is a reasoned departure from the general rule ... so also the Court
should permit lower courts to make reasoned departures from Saucier's inquiry where prin-
ciples of sound and efficient judicial administration recommend a variance.").
2
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discretionary two-step approach was unpopular, particularly in the
Second Circuit.8 Given the criticism and resistance to this "rigid 'or-
der of battle,' "9 the Supreme Court, in Pearson, requested that the
parties brief the issue of whether the Saucier mandatory two-step ap-
proach analysis should be overruled.10 The Court was expected to,
and did, in fact, overrule the mandatory nature of the two-step rule."
It is important to understand that Pearson does not abolish the two-
step approach, but rather makes it discretionary.' 2 In appropriate cas-
es, such as Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding," where
the Court sought to establish a standard, the Court may choose to ad-
dress the merits question and decide whether the facts allege a viola-
tion of a constitutional right.14
The issue in Pearson was whether the "consent-once-
removed" doctrine applied to confidential informants. 5 This doctrine
normally applies when: (1) an undercover police officer is admitted
into a suspect's house; (2) said undercover officer notifies other of-
ficers outside to come in; and (3) the other police officers enter the
home.16 The concept is that the consent given to the undercover of-
ficer operates as consent as to the remaining officers, even though the
defendants have no knowledge of the undercover officer's true identi-
ty.1 Under this doctrine, the officers are not required to present a
warrant.' 8
8 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[lIt is diffi-
cult to see how adherence to the Saucier sequence would accomplish the Supreme Court's
central objective-to make the law clear for future actors."); Koch v. Town of Brattleboro,
287 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although we normally apply this two-step test, where we
are convinced that the purported constitutional right violated is not 'clearly established,' we
retain the discretion to refrain from determining whether, under the first step of the test, a
constitutional right was violated at all.").
9 Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201-02 (Breyer, J., joined by Scalia, J. and Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) ("[W]hen [the] courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid 'order of battle' makes little admin-
istrative sense and can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insu-
lated from review.").
10 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
" Id. at 818.
12 Id.
" 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
14 See id. at 2643 (citing Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822).
15 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822-23.
16 Id. at 814 (citing Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev'd,
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In Pearson, a confidential informant entered a home as part of
a "sting."' 9 When the drugs were exchanged, or at some designated
point, the confidential informant signaled the police, and the officers
entered the home. 20  The issue was whether the "consent-once-
removed" doctrine applied when the person inside the home was not
a police officer or an undercover officer, but rather a confidential in-
formant. 21 The Tenth Circuit decided that the doctrine did not ap-
ply.22 Additionally, the court held that a constitutional violation oc-
curred when the consent given was from a confidential informant,
rather than a police officer.23 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit did not
grant qualified immunity, stating that it was clearly established that
such an entry by the police under these circumstances would violate a
constitutional right.24
In an unanimous opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court
reexamined the mandatory constitutional-question-first procedure re-
quired by Saucier and concluded "that a mandatory, two-step rule for
resolving all qualified immunity claims should not be retained."25
The Court acknowledged much of the criticism that had been leveled
at the "rigid order of battle" by lower court judges and members of
the Court.26 The Court justified its overruling of precedent by hig-
hlighting the various criticisms that have been directed at Saucier's
two-step protocol: (1) deciding the constitutional question first often
resulted in substantial expenditures of resources by both the parties
and the courts on "questions that ha[d] no effect on the outcome of
the case[;]" 27 (2) the development of constitutional doctrine was not
furthered by decisions that were often "so fact-bound that the deci-
19 Id. at 813 ("In 2002, Brian Bartholomew, who became an informant for the task force
after having been charged with the unlawful possession of methamphetamine, informed Of-
ficer Jeffrey Whatcott that respondent Afton Callahan had arranged to sell Bartholomew me-
thamphetamine later that day.").
20 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 813.
21 Id. at 8 14.
22 Id. ("[T]he majority disagreed with decisions that broaden this doctrine to grant infor-
mants the same capabilities as undercover officers." (quoting Callahan, 494 F.3d at 896) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
23 Id. (citing Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898-99).
24 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898-99.
25 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 817.
26 Id.; see cases cited supra notes 8-9.
27 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
436 [Vol. 26
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sion provide[d] little guidance for future cases [;]" 28 (3) it made little
sense to force lower courts to decide a constitutional question that
was pending in a higher court or before an en banc panel; 29 (4) it
likewise did little to further the development of constitutional
precedent to force a decision that depended "on an uncertain interpre-
tation of state law[;]" 30 (5) requiring a constitutional decision at the
pleading stage based on bare or sketchy allegations of fact, or one at
the summary judgment stage resting on "woefully inadequate" briefs,
"create[d] a risk of bad decisionmaking[;]" 31 (6) the mandated two-
step analysis often shielded constitutional decisions from appellate
review when the defendant lost on the "merits" question but prevailed
on the clearly-established-law prong of the analysis. Such un-
reviewed decisions "may have a serious prospective effect" on con-
duct;32 and finally (7) the approach required unnecessary determina-
tions of constitutional law and "depart[ed] from the general rule of
constitutional avoidance."3 3
While abandoning the mandatory nature of the two-step anal-
ysis, the Court continued to recognize that the approach can be bene-
ficial in promoting "the development of constitutional precedent,"
and "is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not fre-
quently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is un-
available."34 In the end, the Court has left it to the lower court judges
to decide, as a matter of discretion, what "order of decisionmaking
will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case."
The Court addressed the expressed "misgivings" about its decision.36
First, it is important to understand that the Saucier approach was not
prohibited; it was simply no longer mandated. 37 Second, constitu-
tional law will continue to develop in other contexts, such as criminal
cases, cases involving claims against government entities, and cases
28 Id. at 819.
29 id
30 id.
" Id at 820.
32 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 820.
3 Id. at 821.
34 Id. at 818, 819.
35 Id. at 821.
36 Id. at 821-22.
3 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821.
2010] 437
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involving claims for injunctive relief 38 Third, the Court did not pre-
dict a flood of suits against local governments by plaintiffs pursuing
novel claims. 39 Nor did the Court anticipate "a new cottage industry
of litigation" over the proper standards to use in "deciding whether to
reach the merits in a given case." 40
Without addressing or overruling the constitutional holding of
the Court of Appeals, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit on the
grounds that the law on the "consent-once-removed" doctrine was not
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct such that a
reasonable officer would have understood the conduct here to be un-
lawful. As the Court explained:
When the entry at issue here occurred in 2002,
the "consent-once-removed" doctrine had gained ac-
ceptance in the lower courts. This doctrine had been
considered by three Federal Courts of Appeals and
two State Supreme Courts starting in the early 1980's.
It had been accepted by every one of those courts.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit had approved the doc-
trine's application to cases involving consensual en-
tries by private citizens acting as confidential infor-
mants. The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion
after the events that gave rise to respondent's suit, and
prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in the present
case, no court of appeals had issued a contrary deci-
sion.
The officers here were entitled to rely on these
cases, even though their own Federal Circuit had not
yet ruled on "consent-once-removed" entries. The
principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from
personal liability when an officer reasonably believes
that his or her conduct complies with the law. Police
officers are entitled to rely on existing lower court
cases without facing personal liability for their ac-
tions. . . . [H]ere, where the divergence of views on
the consent-once-removed doctrine was created by the
3 Id. at 821-22.
' Id. at 822.
40 Id. at 822.
[Vol. 26438
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decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, it is im-
proper to subject petitioners to money damages for
their conduct.41
II. POST-PEARSON LANDSCAPE
The post-Pearson landscape is varied, and it is valuable to
look at what courts are doing with the decision.42 The cases can be
sorted into four categories: (1) cases where the courts find the viola-
tion of a clearly established right, and thus, deny qualified immunity;
(2) cases where the courts find no constitutional violation and grant
qualified immunity; (3) cases where the courts invoke their newly
found discretion under Pearson to avoid reaching the "merits" prong
of qualified immunity, and grant qualified immunity based on the
"clearly established law" prong; and (4) cases where the courts find a
constitutional violation but grant qualified immunity because the law
was not clearly established at the time.
A. Violation of a Clearly Established Right: Qualified
Immunity Denied
Obviously, there are still a significant number of cases where
the courts will find that official conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right. Nelson v. Correctional Medical ServiceS43 was
an en banc decision authored by the Honorable Diana Murphy, the
only woman ever appointed to the Eighth Circuit.44 It is notable and
surprising that it took an en banc court to decide whether it was a
constitutional violation to put a pregnant prisoner in leg shackles
41 Id. at 822-23 (citations omitted).
42 Compare Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., concurring) ("I
. . . applaud the Court's decision to address the constitutional question in this case even
though not required under Pearson."), with Bash v. Patrick, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1294
(M.D. Ala. 2009) ("In order to avoid the risk of 'bad decisionmaking' or an opinion of 'du-
bious value' the Court will not follow the Saucier procedure in this case." (quoting Pearson,
129 S. Ct. at 819-20)).
43 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
4 See, e.g., Michael W. Unger, US. Circuit Court Judge Diana E. Murphy, 44 FED. LAW.
18, 18-19 (Dec. 1997) ("Twenty years before her elevation to the Court of Appeals in 1994,
Diana Murphy received her law degree with high honors from the University of Minneso-
ta.... From 1980 to 1994, U.S. District Judge Murphy served with distinction as one of the
finest trial judges in Minnesota.").
2010] 439
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while she was in the midst of labor, but the majority of the en banc
court did find such conduct violated a clearly established constitu-
tional right.45 Along similar lines, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held "that forcing a prisoner to undergo an invasive abdo-
minal surgery for the purpose of determining whether or not he is
hiding a cell phone in his rectum is a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right." 46 Most courts will continue to address the me-
rits question where the conduct so clearly violates constitutional
rights. 47
B. No Constitutional Right Alleged: Qualified
Immunity Granted
Courts continue to dispose of cases by reaching the first prong
of the analysis and deciding that the plaintiff has not asserted the vi-
olation of a constitutional right at all.48 For example, in Kelsey v.
County of Schoharie,49 the Second Circuit held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation with regard to the change-out procedure
45 Nelson, 583 F.3d at 538, 540-41.
46 Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
47 See, e.g., Howard v. Kansas City Police Dept., 570 F.3d 984, 988, 990-91 (8th Cir.
2009) (electing to proceed under traditional framework and concluding the officers violated
clearly established law when they acted unreasonably in responding to dangers posed by hot
asphalt); Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying traditional
analysis and finding that an officer's discharge of enough pepper spray in a subdued detai-
nee's face to cause him to lose consciousness violated clearly established law); Bergeron v.
Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7, 12, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), abrogated by, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808 (2009) (addressing merits question where parties had briefed and argued the case pre-
Pearson; holding that Sheriff violated clearly established law when she decommissioned
deputy sheriffs based on their political affiliation); Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d
1170, 1181-85 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding two-step analysis appropriate where defendants vi-
olated Amnesty's clearly established right to assemble, protest, and be heard while doing
so); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding both
prongs of analysis satisfied where prisoner's right to medical care was clearly established).
48 See, e.g., Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2009) (find-
ing officer's fatal shooting of suspect reasonable where officer could have reasonably be-
lieved suspect was reaching for a weapon); McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205-08
(11th Cir. 2009) (finding no violation of Fourth Amendment where sheriffs deputies used
deadly force on suspect who refused to pull over, engaged in a high-speed chase, refused to
show his hands when stopped, and drove the truck toward the deputy); Case v. Eslinger, 555
F.3d 1317, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding two-part inquiry was the "better approach"
where the Sheriff and City were named defendants and their liability turned on whether the
constitutional violation had been committed by the officer; finding no violation where officer
had probable cause for arrest and seizure of property).
49 567 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2009).
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in a jail.50  In this case, all inmates and anyone else who was
processed had to go through a change-out procedure where street
clothes were exchanged for prison clothes.5 1  The majority of the
panel accepted, as fact, that individuals were afforded privacy and
were not subjected to exposing their private parts.52 The assumption
was that there was some sort of barrier where they could protect
themselves from full view.5 3  Justice (then Judge) Sotomayor dis-
sented, stating that whether such privacy was available was an issue
of fact.54 Plaintiffs alleged that they did not have such protection
and, as such, the court should have accepted their allegation as true
for purposes of this ruling.55 Justice Sotomayor stated that if the alle-
gation of no privacy was taken as true, the change-out procedure was,
in fact, an unconstitutional strip search where there was no reasona-
ble suspicion of contraband hidden on one's person.56
C. Qualified Immunity Granted by Jumping to
Second Prong
Many courts are invoking Pearson to dispose of cases on the
second prong of the immunity analysis without deciding the question
of whether there was a constitutional right under the facts alleged by
the plaintiff.57 Three cases illustrate how, in certain contexts, the ri-
50 Id. at 65.
' Id. at 56.
52 Id. at 65.
54 Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 65-66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 66-67.
56 Id. at 71. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently joined the Eleventh Circuit
in holding that:
[T]he rights of arrestees placed in custodial housing with the general jail
population "are not violated by a policy or practice of strip searching
each one of them as part of the booking process, provided that the
searches are no more intrusive on privacy interests than those upheld in
the Bell case," and the searches are "not conducted in an abusive man-
ner."
Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, Nos. 06-15566, 05-17080, 2010 WL 431790, at *13
(9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2010) (en banc) (quoting Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir.
2008)).
5 See, e.g., Estrada v. Rhode Island, No. 09-1149, 2010 WL 376978, at *3-5 (1st Cir. Feb.
4, 2010) (choosing to answer the question of qualified immunity first and concluding that it
was not clearly established that officer's line of questioning into plaintiffs' immigration sta-
tus prolonged the stop such that independent reasonable suspicion was necessary); Weise v.
2010] 441
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Casper, No. 09-1085, 2010 WL 293798, at *6 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2010) ("Because it is plain
that the constitutional right claimed was not clearly established at the time of the alleged vi-
olation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we need not reach the
question of whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights."); Waeschle v.
Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (amended opinion) (disposing of case on the
ground that plaintiff s "alleged constitutionally protected property right to her mother's brain
[was] . . . not clearly established because the underlying state-created property interest [was]
not 'sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing
violate[d] that right' " (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))), reh'g
denied, 576 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2009); Matrisciano v. Randle, 569 F.3d 723, 735, 736 (7th
Cir. 2009) (finding the law not clearly established such that officials would have understood
that transferring Assistant Deputy Director in the Department of Corrections for testifying on
behalf of "infamous prisoner" before the Prisoner Review Board violated First Amendment
rights); Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 535-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that parameters
of plaintiffs right to a name-clearing hearing were not clearly established); Pasco ex rel
Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding the officer's action in termi-
nating the threat posed by presumptively intoxicated suspect fleeing down narrow, curvy
highway at excessive rates of speed did not violate clearly established law, even though no
bystanders were threatened at the time officer "bumped" suspect's car, resulting in the sus-
pect's death); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (exercising judicial re-
straint after Pearson, deciding only the narrower clearly-established-law question, and hold-
ing that "[a]t the time of their detention, neither the Supreme Court nor this court had ever
held that aliens captured on foreign soil and detained beyond sovereign U.S. territory had
any constitutional rights-under the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or other-
wise"); Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1290-92 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding
that the law was not clearly established such that the officers' use of a hogtie or hobble on
noncompliant suspect, resulting in his death, was unlawful); Ramirez v. City of Buena Park,
560 F.3d 1012, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2009) (using Saucier approach on claim of unlawful pat-
down, which was found to violate clearly-established Fourth Amendment right; using Pear-
son approach on unlawful arrest claim and granting qualified immunity on the grounds that a
reasonable officer would not have known his conduct was unlawful under the circums-
tances); Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that case law
did not give fair warning to defendants that their conduct was unconstitutional where "quirky
facts" complicated the constitutional inquiry in a First Amendment employee retaliation
case); Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (on
remand for reconsideration in light of Pearson) (declining to address the "merits" question
and holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct in arrest-
ing suspect for possession of a counterfeit bill when it was not clearly established that specif-
ic intent beyond tender of a counterfeit note was required for probable cause); Christensen v.
Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1276-78 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising its "newfound
discretion" and holding that law enforcement officers would not have known that it was un-
constitutional "to enforce a general ordinance prohibiting unlicensed outdoor business activi-
ty on public property against an artist wishing to sell his wares in a park"); see also Morgan
v. Hubert, No. 08-30388, 2009 WL 1884605, at *4 (5th Cir. July 1, 2009) (finding, in the
context of an Eighth Amendment claim, that the order of analysis was less important "be-
cause the obligation of prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hand of other
inmates [was] clear"); Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216 n.6 (11th Cir. 2009) (observ-
ing that Pearson "has no application in a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim be-
cause the qualified immunity analysis involve[d] only the first prong"); Phillips v. Hust, 588
F.3d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2009) (on remand from Supreme Court).
[T]his is a case "in which the constitutional question is so fact-bound
10
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gid two-step approach is not appropriate, and why courts might
choose to avoid the merits question in the resolution of the qualified
immunity defense.
In Rasul v. Myers,5 8 resolving the first prong of the analysis
would have required the court to decide whether detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay-prisoners captured on foreign soil and brought over to
the naval base-had constitutional rights.59 In other words, the issue
was whether Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights extended to
these particular detainees. The court, apparently unwilling to decide
this difficult question in the context of ruling on qualified immunity,
chose to dispose of the case on an easier basis by declaring that what-
ever constitutional rights might exist for Guantanamo detainees were
certainly not clearly established at the time.60
Another good example is Waeschle v. Dragovic, 61 which was
decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court stated that,
in this case, it did not make sense to address the merits question
first.62 Addressing the merits question would result in the federal
court deciding a difficult question of state law, which would be non-
binding because the state could determine it otherwise. 63  In
that the decision [would] provide ( ] little guidance for future cases."
Thus, gladly exercising our newfound authority, we do not decide
whether Hust's actions violated Phillips's constitutional rights. Rather,
we proceed directly to ask whether Hust is entitled to qualified immuni-
ty.
In light of the Supreme Court's flexible rules for pro se filings,
which do not require and perhaps do not even permit comb-binding, we
have no difficulty concluding that Hust is entitled to qualified immunity.
Id. (citation omitted).
563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 529.
60 Id. at 530.
6 576 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2009).
62 Id. at 544.
63 Id. at 550 ("[W]hether to recognize such a right is a task that the Michigan legislature
and courts are better equipped to handle than this court, which is why we are exercising our
discretion under Pearson to not further explore the first prong of the qualified-immunity test
.... '); see also Whitlock v. Brown, No. 08-2800, 2010 WL 624307, at *1, *6 (7th Cir. Feb.
24, 2010) ("Under [Pearson], we are permitted to skip directly to the second question, and
we do so here ... [where] it is not clear under Indiana law that the information Brown alle-
gedly withheld was material to the probable-cause determination for a charge of criminal
conversion.") (citation omitted). But see Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, No. 08-
3165, 2010 WL 624300, at *4, *9-11 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2010) (addressing the first prong and
11
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Waeschle, the plaintiffs mother died in a nursing home and she sus-
pected some foul play.64 An autopsy of the plaintiffs mother was or-
dered for forensic purposes.65 After the autopsy, her mother's body
was released to the plaintiff for burial.66 However, the plaintiff was
not informed that the brain was not in the body when it was returned
for burial.67 The issues were: (i) whether, under Michigan State law,
the plaintiff had a property right in her mother's brain, and (ii)
whether she had been deprived of that right without due process. 68
The court declined to address these issues and, instead, decided that
the law-whatever it was-was not clearly established at the time.69
Ultimately, the court certified that question to the Michigan Supreme
Court.70
In the last case, Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach," the Ele-
venth Circuit addressed the second question first, and determined that
regardless of whether there was a constitutional violation, it was not
clearly established at the time. 72 The court held that the use of a hob-
ble, tightened to form a hog tie, by officers on an uncooperative and
agitated individual was not clearly established as unlawful. 73 Lewis
exemplifies the approach taken in many Fourth Amendment exces-
sive force cases, which tend to be very fact-specific and not particu-
larly useful vehicles for performing a "rights-declaring" function.
Because establishing a constitutional right may not be helpful in sub-
sequent cases, the courts appropriately address the "clearly-
established" question first. 74
interpreting two Minnesota statutes, involving disorderly conduct and weapons of mass de-
struction, in such a way as to find that defendants violated plaintiffs' clearly established
Fourth Amendment rights).




68 Id. at 541-42.
61 Waeschle, 576 F.3d at 544.
7o Id. at 551.
7' 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009).
72 Id. at 1291.
7 Id. at 1292.
74 See, e.g., Estate of Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We do not
think the law elaboration purpose will be well served here, where the Fourth Amendment
inquiry involves a reasonableness question which is highly idiosyncratic and heavily depen-
dent on the facts."). See generally Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experi-
ment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 667, 709 (2009).
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Given the significant number of cases in which courts are now
opting to dispose of qualified immunity on the second prong, plain-
tiffs' attorneys might be anxious about losing the mandated two-step
approach of Saucier, which was viewed as performing a rights-
establishing function.7 5 Some empirical data suggests that, in fact,
when the courts addressed the issue of whether there was a constitu-
tional right first, they most often found that there was no right. 6
Therefore, Pearson may not hurt plaintiffs and, in fact, might even
help them.
In the three aforementioned cases, for example, it is not clear
that if the courts addressed the constitutional question first, they
would have found a right. However, in some cases, plaintiffs may
want to have the law clearly established, and that argument should be
made to the court. If the case presents issues that are likely to recur
in subsequent cases, it makes sense to set a standard that will be ap-
plicable in other cases. The more factually particular a case is, the
more successfully a defendant can argue that the merits question
should not be addressed first, because it is of little use in future cases.
Alternatively, a plaintiff who argues that the issue is more general,
and not particularly tied to the facts, could push for the constitutional
question to be addressed first. This, of course, is provided that there
are enough facts pleaded in the complaint to withstand the standard
set by Ashcroft v. Iqbal.77
D. Constitutional Right Asserted but Not Clearly
Established
There have been some post-Pearson cases where courts have
found a constitutional right but applied qualified immunity because
the right was not clearly established at the time. The Supreme Court
7 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009).
76 Leong, supra note 74, at 693.
In 76% of the cases where an appellate court ultimately granted qualified
immunity for the defendants, the court also held that the asserted consti-
tutional right did not exist, while in only 17% of cases did the court ac-
knowledge the existence of the right. At a basic level, therefore, our re-
sults similarly demonstrate that courts are more likely to deny than to
acknowledge constitutional rights.
Id
77 See 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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has adhered to the Saucier approach, in a post-Pearson case, where
plaintiffs asserted claims against individual defendants, along with a
Monell v. Department of Social Services78 claim against a govern-
ment entity. In Redding,79 the Court held that the school officials'
strip search of a thirteen-year-old middle school girl, suspected of
bringing prescription-strength Ibuprofen to school, was a violation of
the student's Fourth Amendment rights.8 0 Applying the rationale of
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 8 1 the majority concluded that the scope of the
search was totally unwarranted in light of the age and sex of the stu-
dent and the minimal threat presented by the specific "drugs" being
sought.82 While eight Justices found the search unlawful, 83 only Jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg would have denied qualified immunity to
the school official who ordered the search.84 As Justice Stevens put
it, this was "in essence, a case in which clearly established law meets
clearly outrageous conduct."8 The Court remanded the case for con-
sideration of the Monell claim against Safford, Arizona.86
In Stoot v. City of Everett,87 a Ninth Circuit case, the issue
was whether a police officer could rely solely on the uncorroborated
and inconsistent statements of a very young victim of alleged sexual
abuse in order to establish probable cause to seize or arrest the sus-
pect. 8 The court held that relying solely on the statements of the
very young victim was a constitutional violation. 89  But, the court
78 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Court declared the
rule that "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory," but can be held liable where constitutional violations result from official policy or
custom. Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
7 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
80 Id. at 2637-38.
8 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (reasoning that "a search will be permissible in its scope
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not ex-
cessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction").
82 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
83 See id. at 2646-58 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that only Justice Thomas would have upheld the constitutionality of the
search).




8 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009).
88 Id. at 919.
89 Id. at 921.
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went on to hold that the law was not so clearly established at the time
that a reasonable police officer would have understood his action to
constitute a violation; therefore, qualified immunity applied to the ar-
rest.90 In Greene v. Camreta,91 the Ninth Circuit again opted to clari-
fy the law in order to "provide guidance to those charged with the
difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines of the
Fourth Amendment." 92 The court held that the in-school seizure of a
child suspected of being abused by her parents was unconstitutional
where there was no warrant, no court order, no exigent circums-
tances, and no consent. 93 While recognizing that such conduct was
unlawful, the court granted qualified immunity to the officials in-
volved because Ninth Circuit precedent "did not clearly establish that
the in-school seizure of a student suspected of being the victim of
child sexual abuse can be subject to traditional Fourth Amendment
protections."94
Cordova v. Aragon,95 a Tenth Circuit case, is interesting be-
cause it was a high-speed pursuit case 96 that implicated issues from
Scott v. Harris,97 the Supreme Court's decision concerning the use of
deadly force to terminate a pursuit.98 Judge McConnell wrote the
opinion and has since left the bench to become the Director of the
Stanford Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School.99 He
was a conservative jurist, and the facts, in my opinion, described a
much more outrageous high-speed pursuit than in Scott. The defen-
dant was traveling the wrong direction and struck various objects."00
A police officer finally managed to get in front of him on the wrong
side of the road, shot at him as he passed by, and killed him.'01 Judge
McConnell articulated the merits issue as whether this constituted an
unreasonable use of force and unreasonable seizure.102 The opinion
90 Id at 922.
91 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
92 Id. at 1022.
9 Id. at 1030.
94 Id. at 1033.
9s 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009).
9 Id. at 1185.
97 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
98 Id. at 374.
99 John Schwartz, Calfornia: Judge to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A2 1.
100 Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1186.
'0' Id. at 1187.
102 See id at 1188.
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stated that the threat to the officers was a disputed fact, but that the
district court "assumed the officers to be in no immediate danger." 0 3
Any danger to third parties was "less 'imminent' than that posed by
the driver in Scott."104 There was no other traffic on the road, so
there was only a remote possibility that he might kill somebody
else. 05 Weighing the remote possibility of danger to third persons
versus the virtual certainty of shooting and killing him with a gun, the
court decided that there was a Fourth Amendment violation on these
assumed facts.106 The court, then, granted qualified immunity be-
cause the law was not so clear that a reasonable officer would or
should have understood this to be a violation. 0 7 It was unusual that
the court decided the merits question first because this was a particu-
larly fact-specific case. 08 However, the court was concerned about
the prospect of Scott being understood as a blanket approval of any
use of deadly force-shooting as well as ramming-to terminate a
pursuit, even when the danger posed to innocent third persons was
not imminent.109 Cordova at least puts officers on notice that "there
is a spectrum of 'deadly force,' and that just because a situation justi-
fies ramming does not mean it will justify shooting a suspect in the
head." 10
III. HEIGHTENED PLEADING
A. Iqbal & Twombly-A History
With regard to heightened pleading, leading up to Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly,"' a series of Supreme Court cases, including
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordina-
tion Unit,12 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.," 3 and others, unanimous-
103 Id. at 1190.
'04 Id. at 1189.
los Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1190.
106 See id at 1189.
'0 Id. at 1193.
'os Id. at 1186-87.
'09 Id. at 1188-89.
110 Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1189.
'" 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
112 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
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ly rejected any notion of heightened pleading.114 Likewise, in Craw-
ford-El v. Britton,"' the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's
requirement that there be some form of heightened pleading-a high-
er burden of proof at the pleading stage-where motive was involved
in the underlying constitutional violation.1 6 Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, noted that procedural devices already existed to per-
form a screening and clarifying function." 7  The Court noted two
procedural devices available to trial judges that could be used prior to
any discovery." 8 "First, the [district] court may order a reply . .. un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the defendant's
motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)."ll 9 With
these rules, the Court held that there was no need to impose a heigh-
tened pleading requirement.120
In an unexpected departure from this consistent line of cases
affirming the notice pleading standard under Rule 8(a), the Supreme
Court, in Twombly, 1 21 an anti-trust case, retired the "no set of facts"
standard from Conley v. Gibson.122 Although the Court stressed that
113 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
114 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007) ("We once again reiterate ... as we
did unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill-that adopting different and more
onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through es-
tablished rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts."); Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) ("Specific pleading requirements are mandated by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through federal courts' case-
by-case determinations."); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (holding that a heightened pleading
standard that exceeds the pleading standard in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
not be applied with respect to claims alleging municipal liability in § 1983 cases); Swierkie-
wicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (rejecting a "heightened pleading standard for employment discrimina-
tion suits"); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998) (rejecting a "clear and
convincing burden of proof' standard).
523 U.S. 574.
Id. at 594-95. Crawford-El was a First Amendment retaliation case brought by a pris-
oner. Id. at 580-81.
117 Id. at 599-600 (suggesting a myriad of procedural tools available to the trial judge,
which tools can serve as alternatives to the requirement of heightened pleadings). The Court
also stressed the role of "the discovery process [in] facilitat[ing] prompt and efficient resolu-
tion of the lawsuit." Id. at 599. Finally, Rule 11 "authorizes sanctions for the filing of pa-
pers that are frivolous, lacking in factual support, or 'presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass.' " Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 600.
"' Id. at 598.
119 Id; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a); FED. R. CIv. P. 12(e).
120 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 600-01.
121 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
122 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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it was not requiring "heightened fact pleading of specifics," 23 the
Court also made clear that "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do,"l 24 and that a
plaintiff would have to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."1 25 Within two weeks of issuing Twom-
bly, however, the Court in Erickson v. Pardus,126 in a per curiam de-
cision, chastised the Tenth Circuit for its "departure from the liberal
pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)" in a pro se case brought
by a prisoner complaining about his removal from a hepatitis C
treatment program. 127 The Court held it was error for the court of ap-
peals to conclude that allegations concerning the harm caused by the
termination of the treatment were too conclusory for pleading pur-
poses. 128
Despite Erickson and frequent disclaimers, as in Jones v.
Bock,129 about the imposition of a heightened pleading require-
ment, 130 it is difficult to characterize the Court's latest decision on
pleading as anything other than a case that will require plaintiffs to
plead specific facts in some detail in order to avoid a motion to dis-
miss and open the gates to discovery. Call it what you will, plaintiffs
are advised to support allegations in the complaint with as many spe-
cific facts as possible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal'3 1 involved a Muslim Pakistani, who was ar-
rested on immigration charges, detained, convicted, and deported in
the wake of 9/11.132 Iqbal claimed that he was designated a "person
of high interest" and subjected to harsh detention conditions based on
his race, religion, or national origin in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution. 33 Review in the Supreme Court
was limited to the sufficiency of the allegations with respect to the
claims asserted against former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and
123 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
124 Id. at 555.
125 Id. at 570.
126 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
127 Id. at 94.
128 id.
129 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007).
130 See cases cited supra note 114.
131 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
132 Id. at 1939.
133 Id. at 1943.
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the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller. In holding that Iqbal's
pleadings were insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, Justice
Kennedy wrote for a five-to-four majority of the Court. 134  He ex-
plained that "two working principles" underlie the decision in Twom-
bly: "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allega-
tions contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."1 35
Thus, Rule 8 "does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions."1 36  Second, "only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss., 13 7  Determining plausibility will be a "context-specific
task" requiring application of judicial experience and common
sense.138
The bottom line in Iqbal is that pleadings that contain legal
conclusions, as viewed by the Court, will be deemed insufficient un-
less those conclusions are supported by specific factual allegations.139
Applying this heightened standard to Iqbal's pleadings against Ash-
croft and Mueller, the Court found the complaint lacking sufficient
facts to make plausible the claim that these officials had purposefully
subjected Iqbal to harsh treatment because of his race, religion, or na-
tional origin.14 0 Iqbal was a Bivens l4 action, challenging conduct of
very high-level government officials, in the wake of a devastating at-
tack upon this country, and a case asserting constitutional claims re-
quiring proof of impermissible motive.14 2 Plaintiffs may try to cabin
134 Id. at 1950-51. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ali-
to, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 1941. Justice Souter filed a dissent in which Justices Gins-
burg, Stevens, and Breyer joined. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1962 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 1949 (majority opinion).
136 Id. at 1950.
37 Id.
131 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1950-51. In some sense, Iqbal seems to accomplish what Crawford-El ruled
against, by requiring heightened pleadings where the underlying constitutional violation is
one involving motive. Id. at 1952. Iqbal will no doubt lead to a different outcome in some
cases, but pro se plaintiffs should continue to benefit from Erickson. See, e.g., Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Plaintiffs need not lard their complaints with
facts; the federal system uses notice pleading rather than fact pleading. Knowledge and in-
tent, in particular, need not be covered in detail[.]" (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007))).
141 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
142 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
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Iqbal by underscoring the very "context-specific" facts that gave rise
to its holding.143
A number of judges have commented that Iqbal and Twombly
are being over-read.144  A transcript from an oral hearing before
Judge Milton Shadur, a well-respected judge from the Northern Dis-
143 A good case for plaintiffs to examine is Chao v. Ballista, where plaintiffs claims
against supervisory officials survived a motion to dismiss. 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177-79 (D.
Mass. 2009). The plaintiff, a prison inmate, had been sexually abused repeatedly over an
extended period of time by a prison guard. Id. With respect to the claims against the super-
visors, including the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction, the
court concluded "[the] factual allegations [of the complaint] raise the plausible inference
that, given their supervisory duties and security responsibilities, the Defendants failed to
adequately train, supervise, or investigate [the guard's] year-long sexual encounters with
[Plaintiff]." Id. at 178. The court noted that "the state of mind required to make out a super-
visory claim under the Eighth Amendment-i.e., deliberate indifference-requires less than
the discriminatory purpose or intent that lqbal was required to allege in his suit against Ash-
croft and Mueller." Id. at 178 n.2; see also Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005,
1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
In light of [the] allegations [in the complaint], the Court finds Padilla has
alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the requirement that Yoo set in motion
a series of events that resulted in the deprivation of Padilla's constitu-
tional rights. . . . Here, in contrast [to Iqbal], Padilla alleges with speci-
ficity that Yoo was involved in the decision to detain him and created a
legal construct designed to justify the use of interrogation methods that
Padilla alleges were unlawful.
Id. For other post-Iqbal decisions, see, e.g., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969-72
(9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that "factual content contained within the complaint does not
allow us to reasonably infer that [Secret Service] Agents ordered the relocation of Plaintiffs'
demonstration because of its anti-Bush message, and it therefore fails to satisfy Twombly and
Iqbal"); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 273 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[A]nalyzing the plead-
ings under Iqbal, we hold that the allegations of the complaint do not allege a sufficient con-
nection between the Mayor and the alleged conscience-shocking behavior-the killing of the
seized pets-to state the elements of a substantive due process violation."); Kyle v. Holina,
No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009) (revisiting conclusion
in light of Iqbal, which the court found "implicitly overturned decades of circuit precedent in
which the court of appeals had allowed discrimination claims to be pleaded in a conclusory
fashion.... Under the Supreme Court's new standard, an allegation of discrimination needs
to be more specific."); see also Boring v. Google Inc., No. 09-2350, 2010 WL 318281, at *2
(3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2010); Kirby v. Dallas County Adult Prob. Dep't, Nos. 08-2265, 08-2292,
2009 WL 5064789, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2009); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193
(4th Cir. 2009); Mitchell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2009); al-
Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g denied, 2010 WL 961855 (9th cir.
Mar. 18, 2010) (en banc); Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4352 (PKC),
2010 WL 92484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2010).
'" See Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals warned that "Bell Atlantic must not be
over-read." Id
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trict of Illinois, provides a wonderful illustration.145 In the hearing,
the city moved to dismiss, citing Twombly and Iqbal.146 This was the
colloquy that followed:
When I got this motion, my guess was that Ms.
Neeley, who was the one who drafted it, didn't make
what I suppose is in some respects an ill-conceived ca-
reer switch that I did well over 60 years ago[,] when I
went from majoring in physics and mathematics to the
law. But[,] you know[,] you don't have to be a nuc-
lear physicist to recognize that [Twombly] and [Iqbal]
don't operate as a kind of universal "get out of jail
free" card. That seems to be the approach-and I
mean no offense, Ms. Neeley, because you are not
alone-of too many defense counsel, just as though
those decisions had somehow blotted out what had
been two unanimous Supreme Court decisions, the
first written by that noted liberal, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, in that Leatherman against Tarrant County, and
then the latter one, written by the even better known
flaming liberal, you know, Justice Thomas, in Swier-
kiewicz against Sorema.
As you might guess this whole business of
what effect to give to Twombly and Iqbal has been a
topic of discussion among judges here. And I won't
pretend to be able to report everyone's view, but I will
tell you the general sense is what I have just con-
veyed.147
Here is an example of a post-Twombly, pre-Iqbal case from
the Second Circuit that likely would not survive Iqbal:
Boykin is correct that she did not need to allege dis-
criminatory animus for her disparate treatment claim
to be sufficiently pleaded. There is no heightened
pleading requirement for civil rights complaints alleg-
145 Transcript of Oral Argument at 2-3, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 3629 (N.D.
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ing racial animus . . . . Here, it is sufficient that [the]
complaint states that she "is African American fe-
male," describes KeyBank's actions with respect to
her loan application and alleges that she "was treated
differently from similarly situated loan applicants ...
because of her race, sex, and the location of the prop-
erty in a predominantly African-American neighbor-
hood."1 4 8
Perhaps this states a plausible claim, but perhaps another
judge with different judicial experience and different common sense
would read it another way. In stating that there is no heightened
pleading requirement with civil rights complaints alleging racial ani-
mus, plaintiffs should be careful. After Iqbal, there is unquestionably
a requirement to plead with more particularity with regard to these
types of claims. The claim must be more than conceivable-it must
be plausible. This determination is bound to be very subjective, and
will be determined quite differently by different judges in the federal
courts. Especially in cases where motive is an essential element of
the underlying constitutional claim, plaintiffs who request discovery
to show that an allegation has factual support will find themselves in
a quandary: if an allegation is considered conclusory, there is no dis-
covery; however, the only way to get the facts to support the allega-
tion is through discovery.149
B. Post-Iqbal Decisions: Impact on Pleading
Standards
Iqbal is clearly having an impact on pleading requirements
imposed by the courts. Both the Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit
have suggested that Swierkiewicz has been repudiated by Twombly
and Jqbal.'5 0 In Cooney v. Rossiter,'5 1 the Seventh Circuit stated that
148 Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
149 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL
2246194, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) ("A good argument can be made that the Iqbal
standard is too demanding. Victims of discrimination and profiling will often not have spe-
cific facts to plead without the benefit of discovery.").
1so See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The standard that
the plaintiffs quoted from Swierkiewicz . . . was explicitly overruled in Twombly."); Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) ("We have to conclude ... that be-
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"the height of the pleading requirement is relative to the circums-
tances."l 52  In comparing the two cases-Twombly and Iqbal-the
circumstances in Twombly consist of a complicated antitrust case that
would necessitate extensive, expensive, and prolonged discovery.
As a result, the Court would raise the standard. 5 4 Similarly, in Iqbal,
where the circumstances involve high-level officials and qualified
immunity, the Court is going to make it tougher to get out of the gate
and into discovery.'5 5  In Cooney, the Seventh Circuit noted that al-
though this case involved neither complexity nor immunity, "parano-
id pro se litigation" may be occurring, and so the heightened pleading
standard applied.156
al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,'5 7 a Ninth Circuit case, is a good case for
plaintiffs to review. In fact, most of the good cases for plaintiffs are
now in the Ninth Circuit waiting to be overruled.' 5 8 In al-Kidd, there
were several different claims.' 59 First, al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft
was responsible for a policy followed by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and Department of Justice, whereby these agencies "sought
material witness orders without sufficient evidence" and improperly
and intentionally used those orders to put people into custody.1 60 In
other words, it was alleged that these witness orders were not issued
to secure the testimony of material witnesses, but rather, the agencies
used them as a means of investigating and holding witnesses as sus-
cause Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swier-
kiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.").
... 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009).
152 Id. at 971.
153 id.
154 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that the plain-
tiff need not allege specific facts, but nonetheless, the plaintiff failed to state enough facts to
make his claim plausible).
1 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
156 Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971.
157 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
158 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at 15 (stating
that "[t]he 9th Circuit is overturned [by the Supreme Court] more than any other appeals
court"). A district court from the Northern District of Illinois has recently relied on both al-
Kidd and Padilla in denying a motion to dismiss in a case brought by two American citizens
who claim to have been tortured while held in a prison in Iraq. Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C
6964, 2010 WL 850173 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2010). After reviewing the allegations of the
complaint, the court concluded "that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to survive Rums-
feld's motion to dismiss on account of a lack of personal involvement." Id. at *7.
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pects, even though there was not sufficient evidence.161  The court
stated that the allegations, with respect to the violation of the material
witness statute, must pass the Iqbal hurdle.162 al-Kidd did allege facts
with respect to what Ashcroft did, which would make him personally
involved in this decision to use the material witness statute. in this
way; therefore, as for the material witness claim, the plaintiff satis-
fied the Iqbal hurdle.163
The second claim was substantially similar to that asserted in
Iqbal and involved the conditions of confinement.164 Here, the court
decided that al-Kidd did not meet the Iqbal standard.165 Just as in Iq-
bal, al-Kidd was not able to show that Ashcroft had any particular
knowledge or purpose with respect to the conditions under which he
was confined. 66 Here, the allegations were deemed conclusory,167
therefore, the plaintiffs conditions claim could not succeed under Iq-
bal. 168
In Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security,169 a district
court judge for the Northern District of the California stated that "[a]
good argument can be made that the Iqbal standard is too demanding.
Victims of discrimination and profiling will often not have specific
facts to plead without the benefit of discovery."170  However,
"[d]istrict judges . . . must follow the law as laid down by the Su-
preme Court."' 71 Although the court noted that the plaintiff failed to
allege the requisite facts for motive needed to state a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the allegations of a Fourth Amendment violation
were sufficient, and the case proceeded on that claim, which requires
a showing of objective unreasonableness.1 72 Discovery was permit-
ted on the Fourth Amendment claim, and the court suggested that the
plaintiff may be able to add a Fourteenth Amendment claim if suffi-
161 Id.
162 Id. at 974.
161 Id. at 975.
164 al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 978.
165 Id. at 978-79.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 979.
168 Id.
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cient facts were uncovered during the discovery process.173 A plain-
tiff may also strategize by filing the case in state court, alleging only
state law claims. She can conduct discovery, and if further facts are
discovered, then she can amend the complaint to add the federal
claim to the state court complaint. At that point, defendants might
request removal, or the plaintiff might voluntarily dismiss and file in
federal court.174
Discrepancies in pleading standards are also implicated in
cases concerning Monell claims.175 Some courts are taking the posi-
tion that Twombly and Iqbal overrule Leatherman,176 and that more
than mere conclusory allegations must be alleged to state a claim for
municipal liability under § 1983.177 Other courts maintain that Lea-
therman is still good law, and there is no heightened pleading stan-
173 Ibrahim, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10.
174 See, e.g., id. at 4.
175 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Court declared the
rule that "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory," but can be held liable where constitutional violations result from official policy or
custom. Id. at 691.
176 See supra note 114.
17 See, e.g., Howard v. City Of Girard, No. 08-3586, 2009 WL 2998216, at *3 (6th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2009) ("Despite the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
'a short and plain statement of the claim' at the complaint stage, we hold that plaintiffs
amended complaint falls short of the Twombly threshold."); Birgs v. City of Memphis, No.
09-2468, 2010 WL 625401, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2010) ("Although intensive fact
pleading is not required, a plaintiff has the burden to plead more than conclusory state-
ments."); Hutchison v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 3:09-0397, 2010
WL 565156, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010) ("In the context of Section 1983 municipal lia-
bility, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have interpreted Iqbal's standards strictly."); Cuevas
v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 4169(LAP), 2009 WL 4773033, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2009) ("Plaintiffs boilerplate allegations against the City of New York satisfy neither the
elements enumerated above, nor the pleading requirements set forth in Iqbal."); Young v.
City of Visalia, No. 1:09-CV-115 AWl GSA, 2009 WL 2567847, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2009) ("In light of Iqbal, it would seem that the prior Ninth Circuit pleading standard for
Monell claims (i.e. 'bare allegations') is no longer viable."); Eckert v. City of Chicago, No.
08 C 7397, 2009 WL 1409707, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2009) ("We agree with Defendants
that under the post-Bell Atlantic pleading standard, a plaintiff must provide more than boi-
lerplate allegations to survive a motion to dismiss."); see also Buster v. City of Cleveland,
No. 1:09 CV 1953, 2010 WL 330261, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2010) ("[A] pleading must
more than unadorned, 'the defendant unlawfully harmed me' accusations."); Smith v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., No. 09-0594 (JDB), 2009 WL 4849600, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009) (sug-
gesting that mere conclusory allegations or verbatim recitation of the elements is not suffi-
cient in a Monell pleading); Swift v. McKeesport Hous. Auth., No. 08-275, 2009 WL
3856304, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2009) ("Plaintiffs allegations concerning the establish-
ment of a policy are mere conclusions. Absent specific factual allegations to support the
conclusions, plaintiffs conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth.").
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dard for municipal liability claims.178
III. IQBAL 'S IMPACT ON SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIMS
The issue of supervisory liability had not been briefed or ar-
gued by the parties in Iqbal,179 but Justice Kennedy made some troub-
ling statements about the standard for establishing supervisory liabili-
ty in § 1983 and Bivens actions.so In this case, where the underlying
constitutional claim alleged discriminatory treatment of detainees
based on race, religion, or national origin,18 the Court rejected the
argument that high-level supervisory officials (Ashcroft and Mueller)
could be held individually liable in a Bivens action based on "mere
knowledge of [a] subordinate's discriminatory purpose."' 8 2  Justice
Kennedy proclaimed that "[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action-
where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants-the term
'supervisory liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for
his or her own misconduct." 83 Thus, where plaintiffs allege a claim
178 See, e.g., Riley v. County of Cook, 2010 WL 376064, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2010)
("[T]he Supreme Court has expressly rejected a heightened pleading standard for § 1983
claims against a municipality. Courts in this district have affirmed this principle post-
Twombly." (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165-66)) (citation omitted); Gilbert ex rel. James
v. Ross, No. 09-cv-2339, 2010 WL 145789, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) ("Plaintiff is not
required to meet a heightened pleading standard for a § 1983 official-capacity claim.");
Dwyer v. City of Corinth, No. 4:09-CV-198, 2009 WL 3856989, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 19,
2009) (" 'Boilerplate' allegations of inadequate municipal policies or customs are generally
sufficient."); Abdulkhalik v. City of San Diego, No. 08CV1515-MMA (NLS), 2009 WL
4282004, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (finding that bare allegations of the officers' con-
duct is sufficient); Carnes v. Salvino, No. CV-08-1846-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2568643, at *5
(D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2009) ("[A] claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more than bare allega-
tions. . . .").
17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice
Souter noted in his dissent, Ashcroft and Mueller had conceded "that a supervisor's know-
ledge of a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct"
were "grounds for Bivens liability." Id. The issue presented on appeal was whether the alle-
gations of the complaint were sufficient to state such a claim. Id. Because of the conces-
sion, the Court "received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability
.... ." Id.
1so In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the Court recog-
nized, for the first time, an implied private action for damages against federal officers al-
leged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1972).
"' Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
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that requires the showing of discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs must
allege and prove that a supervisor himself had the impermissible pur-
pose, not just knowledge of a subordinate's discriminatory purpose,
in order to impose liability under § 1983 or Bivens.184
In the wake of Iqbal, four circuits have suggested that the Su-
preme Court's decision may call into question prior circuit law on the
standard for holding a public official liable for damages under § 1983
on a theory of supervisory liability.'8 5  Another court has noted that
"[a] question has arisen as to whether the traditional supervisory-
liability test has been eviscerated by the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion . .. "' While the Court used broad language, several factors
may limit the ultimate reach of this ruling. First, the case challenged
government conduct in the immediate wake of 9/11, a time of intense
crisis and concern about national security. Second, Iqbal was a Bi-
vens action, involving claims against very high-level officials of the
federal government, whom the Court has historically afforded the
highest level of protection from suit. The Court emphasized that im-
plied Bivens actions are disfavored and that it is disinclined to extend
their reach. 8 1 While the Court did reference § 1983, there was no
184 id
185 See Arocho v. Nafziger, No. 09-1095, 2010 WL 681679, at *3 n.4, *1l (10th Cir. Mar.
1, 2010)
[G]iven a recent Supreme Court pronouncement, the basic concept of
§ 1983 or Bivens supervisory liability itself may no longer be tena-
ble. . . . After [Iqbal], circuits that had held supervisors liable when they
knew of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates
have expressed some doubt over the continuing validity of even that li-
mited form of liability.
Id. at *3 n.4 (citations omitted); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The
Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in tqbal may further restrict the incidents in which
the 'failure to supervise' will result in liability."); Bayer v. Monroe County Children &
Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) ("In light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . .. it is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge,
with nothing more, would provide a sufficient basis for holding Bahl liable with respect to
plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983."); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d
263, 275 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) ("Some recent language from the Supreme Court may call into
question our prior circuit law on the standard for holding a public official liable for damages
under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.") (citation omitted).
186 Jackson v. Goord, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307, 324 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Martin A.
Schwartz, Supreme Court Sets Standards for Civil Rights Complaints, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3,
2009, at 3, 7).
187 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 ("Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court
has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability 'to any new context or new category of defen-
dants.' ").
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discussion or analysis of the fact that the explicit language of the
§ 1983 remedial statute provides liability for those who cause consti-
tutional violations, not merely for those who commit them. The cau-
sation language in § 1983-"every person who . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected"-is significant in the statute.' Third, Iqbal was a
case about intentional discrimination, where the underlying claim re-
quired a showing of discriminatory purpose to make out a violation.
Discriminatory purpose is not required to make out claims of unrea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment or subjective deliberate in-
difference under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 189  Even
prior to Iqbal, in cases involving supervisory liability for claims of
deliberate indifference to medical or safety needs of prisoners or de-
tainees, some courts required plaintiffs to prove that the supervisors,
as well as their subordinates, acted with the subjective deliberate in-
difference required to state an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment
claim.' 90 After Iqbal, if the specific constitutional violation requires a
118 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2010).
189 See, e.g., Estate of Allen ex rel. Wrightsman v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, No. 1:08-cv-
0774-SEB-TAB, 2009 WL 2091002, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2009) (finding plaintiffs were
not to rely "solely on a theory of supervisory liability" where they alleged that Sheriff "did
nothing despite knowing that [deceased] and others [in jail] were not receiving necessary
medical attention"); Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 n.2 (D. Mass. 2009) (noting
that "the state of mind required to make out a supervisory claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment-i.e., deliberate indifference-requires less than the discriminatory purpose or intent
that Iqbal was required to allege in his suit against Ashcroft and Mueller"). But see Jacobs v.
Strickland, No. 2:08-cv-680, 2009 WL 1911781, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2009) (noting
that in a complaint alleging violations of RLUIPA and First Amendment based on failure to
meet religious dietary requirements, the court held complaint against supervisors must be
dismissed even if allegations that "the supervisor ha[d] actual knowledge of the constitution-
al violation as long as the supervisor did not actually participate in or encourage the wrong-
ful behavior"); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801(SAS), 2009 WL
1835939, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (stating that on claim of deliberate indifference
to medical needs, the court concluded that "Iqbal v. Ashcroft abrogate[d] several of the cate-
gories of supervisory liability enumerated in Colon v. Coughlin [58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.
1995)]" and that "a supervisor [was] only held liable if that supervisor participate[d] directly
in the alleged constitutional violation or if that supervisor create[d] a policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occurred"); Levy v. Holinka, No. 09-cv-279-slc, 2009 WL
1649660, at *3 (W.D. Wis. June 11, 2009) (alleging a claim under RFRA; mere knowledge
and acquiescence not enough). Excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment require
a showing of "malicious and sadistic" use of force, and some substantive due process claims
will require a showing of "purpose to harm" in order to "shock the conscience." See County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6
(1992).
190 See, e.g., Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer v. Bren-
nan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)) (rejecting plaintiffs argument-that a supervisor's corrective in-
28
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showing of discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs will be required to al-
lege and prove that the supervisor had the discriminatory purpose,
and will not be permitted to assert liability based on mere knowledge
and acquiescence.
Of course, this requirement that the supervisor be held to the
same constitutional standard as the subordinate can work in plain-
tiffs' favor in some cases. For example, with a Fourth Amendment
violation where the standard is objective reasonableness, according to
Iqbal, a plaintiff should be able to assert a claim of supervisory lia-
bility by alleging that a supervisor's failure to train on the use of a
taser was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.19' Such
a determination coincides with the standard for a Fourth Amendment
violation. 192 Failure to train, itself, may satisfy the level of culpabili-
ty if it is objectively unreasonable 93 and causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to a Fourth Amendment violation.194  Prior to Iqbal, the
majority of courts have applied the City of Canton'95 standard of ob-
jective deliberate indifference to supervisory liability for the "failure
to train" cases.196 Neither subjective nor objective deliberate indiffe-
action could be found to constitute deliberate indifference toward the underlying constitu-
tional violation if the supervisor knew or should have known of the violation-and applying
the subjective standard of deliberate indifference, requiring proof of supervisors' actual
knowledge of the violations to find them liable.); see also Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp.,
430 F.3d 245, 254 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that deliberate indifference in context of supervi-
sory liability required showing of subjective knowledge of serious risk of harm to patients);
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring plaintiff to establish
that sheriff actually knew that plaintiff was assigned to particular cell block and that sheriff
inferred from that assignment that there was substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff).
'91 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (explaining that a supervisor, in order to establish super-
visor liability, must have violated a constitutional right; however, the factors necessary to
establish a violation will vary depending on which Amendment of the Constitution has been
violated).
192 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822 (2009) (noting that the applicable
standard in a search and seizure case is whether the action was objectively reasonable); Los
Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) ("The test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is an objective one.").
193 See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822 (noting that inquiry on the constitutionality of an act
falls on whether or not the act was objectively reasonable).
194 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (stating that if the violation sufficiently meets the criteria ne-
cessary to establish a constitutional violation under the appropriate amendment, then it can
be used to prove supervisory liability).
1 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
196 See, e.g., McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2004) (indicating that a
municipality's action must have been "taken with . . . deliberate indifference to its . . . con-
sequences") (internal quotations omitted); Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th
Cir. 1996) (indicating that a cause of action against a supervisor for failure to supervise his
29
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rence is required for Fourth Amendment violations,19 so plaintiffs
should make the argument that objectively unreasonable failures to
train, supervise, or discipline that result in subordinate officers com-
mitting Fourth Amendment violations should suffice for holding su-
pervisors liable as well.'98
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, it is worth noting that Iqbal says nothing about liabili-
ty of governmental entities under Monell, where the Court has clearly
recognized that entities may be held liable under § 1983 for policies
or customs that are objectively deliberately indifferent to the likelih-
ood that employees will violate citizens' constitutional rights. 99 It
appears that Iqbal and City of Canton may be on a collision course.
The Court in City of Canton, decided that the city can be held liable,
not because it has a policy that is unconstitutional, but because it was
deliberately indifferent in an objective way.200 To clarify, the city did
not commit a constitutional violation, but rather was deliberately in-
different in that it knew, or should have known that its failure to train,
supervise, discipline, etc., would cause the underlying constitutional
violation. 20' The Court adopted a causation approach to § 1983, and
subordinates can only be made when the supervisor exhibited deliberate indifference).
19 See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822 (noting that a Fourth Amendment violation determina-
tion is based on whether the act was objectively reasonable).
198 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 08-1652 (PGS),
2010 WL 398839, at *5, *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2010).
Plaintiffs here do not allege invidious discrimination, but rather viola-
tions of their Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Plaintiffs' pleadings must
be analyzed under the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards. . . . It
is important to note that the Supreme Court in Jqbal distinguished its
case from the type of case presently before this Court. . . . "Purposeful
discriminatory intent" because of "race, religion, or national origin" is
not an element of a Fourth Amendment claim.
Id.; see also Sash v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 8332(AJP), 2009 WL 4824669, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) ("Where the constitutional claim does not require a showing of
discriminatory intent, but instead relies on the unreasonable conduct or deliberate indiffe-
rence standards of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the personal involvement analysis set
forth in Colon v. Coughlin may still apply.").
199 See Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-90.
20 Id at 388.
201 Id. at 389 ("Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant re-
spect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a short-
coming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983.").
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stated that an entity can be liable for causing a constitutional viola-
tion.202 There is no requirement under City of Canton that the go-
vernmental entity or any policymaker must be shown to have the par-
ticular state of mind required by the underlying constitutional
offense.
Iqbal, on the other hand, insists that the supervisor not merely
cause a constitutional violation, but must himself or herself demon-
strate the level of culpability needed to make out the underlying con-
stitutional wrong.203 It is difficult to reconcile Iqbal with City of
Canton unless one accepts that the Court is drawing a distinction be-
tween the types of "persons" who may be sued under § 1983 and es-
tablishing different standards for entity and individual liability.204
Pre-Iqbal, courts would routinely borrow concepts from municipal
liability and apply them to supervisory liability. 205 After Iqbal, both
litigants and courts need to assess the elements of the particular con-
stitutional violation asserted and decide what acts or omissions will
suffice to implicate the supervisor in the constitutional wrongdoing.
It is too early to assess what impact Iqbal will have on § 1983 super-
visory claims, or whether Iqbal and City of Canton can co-exist, but
litigants are advised to keep a close watch on case law developing in
the circuits.
202 See id. (noting that a municipality can be held liable for unconstitutional violations
when the municipality's policies are the cause or "moving force" of the violation).
203 Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (rejecting the argument that supervisors can be lia-
ble for subordinates' policy violations; if the government official or supervisor is not subject
to vicarious liability, he or she is only liable for his or her own conduct), with Canton, 489
U.S. at 386-88 (explaining that the city failed to adequately train the municipal employees,
particularly police officers, when it was the city's obligation to do so and therefore it caused
the constitutional violation).
204 Compare Canton, 489 U.S. at 380 (indicating that the city, which is an entity, could be
subject to municipal liability), with lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942 (indicating that this case of su-
pervisory liability was the result of a lawsuit against the Attorney General and FBI director
personally, not an entity).
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